Currently, legal scholars agree that in some cases legal rules do not specify a definite outcome. These scholars believe that such indeterminacy results from the vagueness of language: the boundaries of the application of a term are often unclear. Nevertheless, they maintain that the system of legal rules by and large rests on clear core meanings that do determine definite outcomes for most cases. Contrary to this view, an earlier group of legal philosophers, called “realists,” argued that indeterminacy pervades every part of the law.
　　The realists held that there is always a cluster of rules relevant to the decision in any litigated case. For example, deciding whether an aunt’s promise to pay her niece a sum of money if she refrained from smoking is enforceable would involve a number of rules regarding such issues as offer, acceptance, and revocation. Linguistic vagueness in any one of these rules would affect the outcome of the case, making possible multiple points of indeterminacy, not just one or two, in any legal case.
　　For the realists, an even more damaging kind of indeterminacy stems from the fact that in a common-law system based on precedent, a judge’s decision is held to be binding on judges in subsequent similar cases. Judicial decisions are expressed in written opinions, commonly held to consist of two parts: the holding (the decision for or against the plaintiff and the essential grounds or legal reasons for it, that is, what subsequent judges are bound by), and the dicta (everything in an opinion not essential to the decision, for example, comments about points of law not treated as the basis of the outcome). The realists argued that in practice the common-law system treats the “holding/dicta” distinction loosely. They pointed out that even when the judge writing an opinion characterizes part of it as “the holding,” judges writing subsequent opinions, although unlikely to dispute the decision itself, are not bound by the original judge’s perception of what was essential to the decision. Later judges have tremendous leeway in being able to redefine the holding and the dicta in a precedential case. This leeway enables judges to choose which rules of law formed the basis of the decision in the earlier case. When judging almost any case, then, a judge can find a relevant precedential case which, in subsequent opinions, has been read by one judge as stating one legal rule, and by another judge as stating another, possibly contradictory one. A judge thus faces an indeterminate legal situation in which he or she has to choose which rules are to govern the case at hand.
　　15. According to the passage, the realists argued that which one of the following is true of a common-law system?
　　(A) It gives rise to numerous situations in which the decisions of earlier judges are found to be in error by later judges.
　　(B) It possesses a clear set of legal rules in theory, but in practice most judges are unaware of the strict meaning of those rules.
　　(C) Its strength lies in the requirement that judges decide cases according to precedent rather than according to a set of abstract principles.
　　(D) It would be improved if judges refrained from willfully misinterpreting the written opinions of prior judges.
　　(E) It treats the difference between the holding and the dicta in a written opinion rather loosely in practice.
　　16. According to the passage, which one of the following best describes the relationship between a judicial holding and a judicial decision?
　　(A) The holding is not commonly considered binding on subsequent judges, but the decision is.
　　(B) The holding formally states the outcome of the case, while the decision explains it.
　　(C) The holding explains the decision but does not include it.
　　(D) The holding consists of the decision and the dicta.
　　(E) The holding sets forth and justifies a decision.
　　17. The information in the passage suggests that the realists would most likely have agreed with which one of the following statements about the reaction of judges to past interpretations of a precedential case, each of which states a different legal rule?
　　(A) The judges would most likely disagree with one or more of the interpretations and overturn the earlier judges’ decisions.
　　(B) The judges might differ from each other concerning which of the interpretations would apply in a given case.
　　(C) The judges probably would consider themselves bound by all the legal rules stated in the interpretations.
　　(D) The judges would regard the lack of unanimity among interpretations as evidence that no precedents existed.
　　(E) The judges would point out in their holdings the inherent contradictions arising from the earlier judges’ differing interpretations.
　　18. It can be inferred from the passage that most legal scholars today would agree with the realists that
　　(A) Linguistic vagueness can cause indeterminacy regarding the outcome of a litigated case.
　　(B) In any litigated case, several different and possibly contradictory legal rules are relevant to the decision of the case.
　　(C) The distinction between holding and dicta in a written opinion is usually difficult to determine in practice.
　　(D) The boundaries of applicability of terms may sometimes be difficult to determine, but the core meanings of the terms are well established.
　　(E) A common-law system gives judges tremendous leeway in interpreting precedents, and contradictor readings of precedential cases can usually be found.
　　19. The passage suggests that the realists believed which one of the following to be true of the dicta in a judge’s written opinion?
　　(A) The judge writing the opinion is usually careful to specify those parts of the opinion he or she considers part of the dicta.
　　(B) The appropriateness of the judge’s decision would be disputed by subsequent judges on the basis of legal rules expressed in the dicta.
　　(C) A consensus concerning what constitutes the dicta in a judge’s opinion comes to be fixed over time as subsequent similar cases are decided.
　　(D) Subsequent judges can consider parts of what the original judge saw as the dicta to be essential to the original opinion.
　　(E) The judge’s decision and the grounds for it are usually easily distinguishable from the dicta.
　　20. Which one of the following best describes the overall organization of the passage?
　　(A) A traditional point of view is explained and problems arising from it are described.
　　(B) Two conflicting systems of thought are compared point for point and then evaluated.
　　(C) A legal concept is defined and arguments justifying that definition are refuted.
　　(D) Two viewpoints on an issue are briefly described and one of those viewpoints is discussed at greater length.
　　(E) A theoretical description of how a system develops is contrasted with the actual practices characterizing the system.
　　21. Which one of the following titles best reflects the content of the passage?
　　(A) Legal Indeterminacy: The Debate Continues
　　(B) Holding Versus Dicta: A Distinction Without a Difference
　　(C) Linguistic Vagueness: Is It Circumscribed in Legal Terminology?
　　(D) Legal Indeterminacy: The Realist’s View of Its Scope
　　(E) Legal Rules and the Precedential System: How Judges Interpret the Precedents